OT/SCADA Security Testing for Critical Infrastructure and Industrial Environments
Non-intrusive security assessments that uncover real attack paths across your industrial control systems, SCADA networks, and IT/OT convergence points without disrupting production operations.
Trusted by India's leading enterprises
The inversion
In OT the priority order turns upside down, and so does the testing
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IT
Confidentiality first
On the business network the worst outcome is usually disclosure, so controls optimise for keeping data in and testing optimises for finding the path to it.
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OT
Availability and safety first
On the plant floor the worst outcome is a process that stops or behaves unsafely. Confidentiality matters and it is not what the environment is engineered around.
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What follows
The test has to change shape
A probe that is routine on an IT network can halt a controller. Availability is the property under protection, so an assessment that risks it to find a finding has misunderstood the job.
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And the estate
Equipment older than the threat model
Controllers commissioned before network security was a design input, running protocols with no authentication because none was contemplated. Patching is bounded by vendor certification and by outage windows measured in months.
Where the real path runs
Almost nobody attacks a PLC first
The realistic intrusion path into a control environment starts on the business network and crosses a boundary that everyone believes is tighter than it is. Engineering workstations are the recurring route: dual-homed by convenience, carrying vendor software with broad privileges, often on an older operating system because the engineering suite requires it. Vendor remote access is the second: standing connections created for support, rarely inventoried, frequently sharing credentials across sites, and usually invisible to the team that owns the firewall. Historians and reporting servers are the third, because they exist specifically to move data from the control network to the business one and are therefore permitted to cross. Then there is the flat legacy segment that predates the segmentation project and was never migrated, and the wireless link installed for a contractor in a hurry. Our assessments concentrate there, because that is where an attacker who is not already inside would actually go, and because every one of those can be tested without touching a live controller. Establishing the boundary honestly is the thing most sites have never had done, and it is worth more than a finding list on any single device.
How we assess it
Methods matched to what the system can tolerate
Architecture and configuration review
Network design, firewall rule sets, segmentation between levels, remote-access paths and account structure, assessed from documentation and configuration exports without touching the environment.
Passive traffic analysis
Observation of control-network traffic from a span or tap to identify assets, protocols and communication patterns, including devices nobody knew were there. No packets are generated.
Active testing at the IT boundary
Full testing from the business side against the boundary itself, which is where the realistic attack path runs and where testing carries no process risk.
Engineering workstations and jump hosts
Assessed directly, including the vendor software, the privilege model and the remote-access tooling installed on them.
Deep testing in an agreed window
Anything that could affect a live process is scoped explicitly and scheduled into a planned outage, or performed against a test rig where one exists. Never by surprise.
Mapped to IEC 62443
Findings expressed against zones, conduits and security levels so the output feeds a certification path instead of sitting beside it.
What we usually find
Four states, in roughly the order of how often we meet them
| State | What it means | What follows |
|---|---|---|
| Segmented and verified | A boundary between the business and control networks that is enforced by rules matching the diagram, with crossings inventoried. | The target state. Where it exists, the remaining work is about monitoring and about the vendor access paths. |
| Segmented on paper | The diagram shows separation; the rule set, the shared directory, the management network and a historian with interfaces on both sides do not. | The commonest finding by a wide margin, and it is discovered by reading configuration, not by scanning anything. |
| Vendor access uninventoried | Standing remote-access paths for equipment suppliers that the site owns commercially and does not track technically. | A route in that bypasses the boundary entirely, and one where the credentials are frequently shared across sites and across customers. |
| Asset inventory incomplete | Devices on the control network that no current list records, found by listening to the traffic. | Not a failure of diligence so much as of turnover: plants change over decades. It is also the precondition for everything else, since a zone model cannot be drawn around assets nobody has named. |
- Target state
- Blocks the zone model
- A live route across the boundary
Methodology
What happens between kickoff and the report
Every engagement follows this process through Lemon, our proprietary audit management platform.
Scoping and Industrial Environment Discovery
Collaborative workshops with OT engineering, IT security, and plant operations teams to document network architecture, identify all ICS assets and communication flows, define assessment boundaries, and establish safety protocols. ShadowMap external reconnaissance identifies internet-facing industrial assets and exposed services.
Passive Reconnaissance and Network Mapping
Non-intrusive network traffic analysis to map communication patterns between IT and OT zones. Identification of ICS protocols in use, device inventories, firmware versions, and network topology without sending active probes to sensitive industrial controllers.
IT/OT Boundary and Segmentation Assessment
Detailed evaluation of firewall configurations, DMZ architecture, data diode implementations, and access control lists governing traffic between enterprise IT and operational technology networks. Identification of unauthorised cross-zone communication paths.
ICS Protocol and Device Security Testing
Controlled assessment of industrial protocol implementations including Modbus TCP/RTU, DNP3, OPC UA, and PROFINET. Evaluation of authentication mechanisms, encryption usage, command validation, and protocol-level attack vectors — conducted in coordination with plant operations.
IT/OT Convergence Attack Path Analysis
Red team-style evaluation tracing realistic attack chains from enterprise IT environments through convergence points into OT networks. Validates whether an attacker who compromises a corporate workstation or VPN could reach and impact industrial control systems.
Remote Access and Vendor Pathway Review
Assessment of all remote access mechanisms — VPN tunnels, jump servers, vendor maintenance portals, and cloud-based management interfaces — that provide external connectivity into the OT environment. Evaluation of credential management and session controls.
Multi-Layer Review and Validation
All findings undergo L1/L2/L3 review. L1 auditors document findings with detailed proof-of-concepts. L2 senior consultants validate coverage completeness and methodology adherence. L3 security architects confirm impact assessments and ensure reporting accuracy specific to industrial environments.
Reporting, Remediation Roadmap, and Walkthrough
Delivery of executive and technical reports with OT-specific remediation guidance. Prioritised remediation roadmap accounting for industrial patching constraints, maintenance windows, and safety system dependencies. Walkthrough sessions with OT engineering and IT security teams.
"We needed an assessment on a 3-week timeline because of a partner integration deadline. Security Brigade turned it around in 18 days, including the L2 and L3 reviews. The report was regulator-ready — we submitted it to our partner's compliance team unchanged. When speed and credibility both matter, they're the only call we make."
FAQ
OT and SCADA security, answered
Safety, method and what we actually find. Talk to our team about your control environment.
Contact usWill testing disrupt production?
Where do attacks on control environments actually start?
Our equipment is twenty years old and cannot be patched. What then?
How does this relate to IEC 62443?
Do you need to be on site?
Stay protected between assessments with ShadowMap
Continuous attack surface monitoring: it discovers new assets, detects credential leaks, and alerts on new exposures the day they appear.
Secure Your Industrial Environment Before Attackers Find the Path In
Hundreds of India's largest manufacturing conglomerates trust Security Brigade to protect their operational technology. Start with a scoping call to understand your OT security posture.
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